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The Liberal Project of International Organisation and the 
Lure of Professionalism 
 
Günther Auth 
 
Throughout the last century, much has been made of international organisation by 
students of international relations1. Originally alerted by hostilities that eventually 
culminated in World War I, many students of international relations have exhibited 
a pragmatic liberal persuasion and an ‘international mind’2. They have analysed, 
and advocated, organised cooperation in the League of Nations (LoN) and the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) as the appropriate strategy to cope with 
threats to peace and problems induced by growing interdependence. The 
intensification of political and socio-economic crises around the globe has only 
confirmed internationalists about their purpose. For they have become ever more 
enthusiastic about the United Nations Organisation (UNO), the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the European Union (EU), the World Bank System (WB), 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) etc. being harbingers of peace, 
progress, and, respectively, social justice. Based on what they have meant that 
international organisations are and do, liberal internationalists have assumed an 
active stance to strengthen their performance, and to thus making the world a better 
place. Their enthusiasm has even led them to bemoan a new intellectual approach 
to international relations and organisation. In their opinion, studying international 
relations and organisations only through textbooks and from within academic 
institutions has proven inadequate. They now maintain that “[e]ven when the 
relevance of international affairs to everyday life is recognized intellectually, it is 
difficult to give the student a sense of how it feels to be a decision-maker at the 
national and international level.”3 Many internationalists have deplored what they 
see as a gap between the academic study of international relations and the active 
participation in the fora of international organisations. They thus deem it important 
to change the way students are being familiarised with international relations and 
organisations. They endorse what they perceive as a ‘paradigmatic shift’ in 
international relations teaching, namely the use of simulations and case studies, 
which arguably help teachers move both the world of international relations and the 
settings of various international organisations away from textbooks and lecture to 
where the action is. And indeed, since the days when it was at first popularised by 
                                                 
1
 As a gerund, the concept international organisation refers to specific institutional 
activities. Employed in this sense, the term differs from international organisation as a noun, which 
implies that there is some thing-like entity out there. Throughout this article, I use both terms and 
discriminate in this fashion. 
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 For coinage of this phrase, see Nicholas M. Butler, The International Mind: An Argument 
for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes (New York: Scribner’s, 1912). 
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 Daniel McIntosh, “The Uses and Limits of the Model United Nations in an International 
Relations Classroom”, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 2 (2001), 269-280, 269.  
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“[…] university students in the northeastern part of the USA […]”4, the new 
technique of simulation has been embraced by more and more internationalists 
around the world.  
The UN attracts between three and four thousand students each year to 
assemble at its headquarters and to simulate the ‘inner workings of its organs’5. In 
addition, there are meanwhile far more than a hundred Model UN Conferences in 
many countries around the world. The total number of students gathering at these 
conferences in order to simulate the proceedings of the UN Security Council and/or 
the UN General Assembly amounts to approximately one hundred thousand6. Not 
included in this figure are many students who apply in vain for a seat at the 
delegations. The same thing goes on in and around the EU and, respectively, the 
WTO. The number of students who simulate the EU is as yet comparatively small, 
though it is to be expected that the current number of 200 simulators will double 
and triple any time soon. This observation applies to the WTO as well. In all of 
these cases, students who think they already have a fair sense of what international 
organisations are undertake to know better what they actually do by simulating 
negotiation procedures in mock plenary and/or committee settings. The net gain in 
realism allegedly consists in that student participants gain some first-hand 
experience in the art of international diplomacy and intergouvernemental decision-
making. It is through simulation that students presumably learn what it ‘feels’ like 
being a delegate to the UN General Assembly, or to the EU’s Parliament or 
Council7, and what is at stake for them as official participants in a WTO 
Ministerial Conference8.  
This kind of experience with simulated negotiation and voting procedures 
is probably exhilarating for all those involved. And I do not doubt that there are 
participants who are very serious about their undertaking. I firmly believe that 
there are students who harbour the best intentions when they apply for a seat at 
some student delegation. Yet, I think there are good reasons to pause and reflect 
about the real motivation of the average student, and what he/she actually ‘feels’ 
and ‘experiences’ at such occasions. For I suspect that the average student 
participant seeks participation in a mock plenary and/or committee session 
primarily for its making an eye-catching mark on her/his resume. The average 
participant may well experience his/her participation as a vital step on the way 
towards peace, progress, and social justice. But the average participant sure feels in 
a much more immediate sense that his/her delegation is primarily there to win 
many awards, not to speak of the feel that participation in a mock plenary and/or 
committee session is a good step on his/her envisaged career as a professional 
functionary. What the average student participant does almost certainly not feel and 
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 James P. Muldoon, “The Model United Nations Revisited”, Simulation and Gaming, Vol. 
26 (1995), pp. 27-36, at p. 28. 
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 See http://www.nmun.org/discover/demographics.htm. 
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 See http://www.amun.org/experience.php. 
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 See http://www.aegee.rwth-aachen.de/meu/index.php?id=7. 
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 See http://www.model-wto.org/general_information.htm.  
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experience is how organised cooperation (not only) within the conference settings 
of multilateral diplomacy actually operates, not to speak of what it actually does. It 
is for this reason that I deem it sensible to ponder what liberal internationalists, 
based on their impressionistic ‘feels’ and ‘experiences’, increasingly tend to make 
of international organisation/s and the broader context of international relations. 
And I do not only mean students when they simulate, I also mean academics when 
they write this cosmos. 
My preliminary conclusion is that what student and academic 
internationalists tend to make of their preferred object domain, what meaning they 
ascribe to international organisation/s in the context of international relations, 
seems generally very nice and appealing. Yet their images of the real seem 
completely out of synch with views and perceptions among contemporaries who 
observe this object domain in their capacity as critical observes and from a 
standpoint in history that, as such, lies outside the camp of liberal internationalism. 
This article is an attempt to understand the internationalist project from such a 
critical standpoint and to ascertain why its meaning-making activities seem so 
strange for critical observers that are otherwise sympathetic with its overall 
purpose to make the world a better place.  
The overarching premise that underlies and guides my attempt at 
understanding liberal internationalism has purposive meaningful action, whether 
individual or collective action, whether action aimed at simulating the real or 
action aimed at representation, as a practice that is made possible by forces that 
emanate from a socio-cultural context. As I will show, the value and principle of 
‘professionalism’ is a particularly influential cultural force in this regard. So my 
argument is eventually that the meaning-making activities of liberal 
internationalism are increasingly governed by a culture of professionalism. The 
logic through which this culture operates may be circumscribed as follows: ideas, 
norms, and values of a larger societal formation constitute a cultural code that 
impregnates agents and the societal activities in which they are engaged. Societal 
activities are based on meaningful interactions, due to their being composed of 
linguistic and symbolic acts. Said cultural code manifests itself as a ‘web of 
significance’9, a discursive formation. Agents are entangled in such a web, which 
affects not only what linguistic and symbolic resources they avail themselves of, 
but also what purposes they define for themselves, and where and how they engage 
in signifying practices so as to make their acts comprehensible to their interaction 
partners10. It is in this context that the institutional dimension of said formation 
needs to be taken into account as well. For influential ideas, norms, and values of 
the cultural code are channelled through institutions at various levels of society, 
                                                 
9
 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 
1973), at p. 5.  
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 This may be dubbed the psychological dimension of culture which manifests itself in 
specific attitudes, values, and practical dispositions that agents acquire through participation in 
discourse/s. Cf. Mark H. Ross, “Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis”, in: M. I. 
Lichbach & A. S Zuckerman, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 42-80, esp. p. 67-71. 
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encompassing class, law, education, disciplines and professions as well as 
interpersonal relations within the family11. Culture operates through such 
institutions as it predicates societal activities on needs and focal points that pertain 
to these institutions, but that also cohere with ideas, norms, and values that are 
embodied in the larger discursive formation. Thus agents who partake in signifying 
practices within specific institutions orient themselves at focal or reference points 
that are shared by interaction partners and that lead them to employ distinct 
conceptual categories so as to throw light upon particular objects, and to make up 
realisable social worlds. The purposes that they pursue thereby are considered 
natural at this level. Yet, said focal points and purposes also cohere with ideas, 
norms, and values of the cultural code, the discursive formation, in which 
institutions are always embedded. So the adherents of the internationalist project 
encounter particular reference points qua being participants in a discursive process 
that is inextricably linked with the institutional context in which they are situated12. 
Said discourse, plus the institutional context to which it is tied, are engulfed by a 
larger discursive formation and embody ideas, norms, and values, such as 
professionalism, that prevail therein.  
I unfold my argument in the following steps: I first sketch the project of 
student internationalists and spell out what meaning they ascribe to international 
organisation/s when they simulate the inner workings of diplomatic settings. I then 
try to establish why more and more students see so much value in getting inside 
what they take to be the ‘real’. This leads me to trace the internationalist project of 
students back to the meaning-making activities of academic internationalists. For it 
is them, and their discursive products, that provide the very context in which 
students evolve the perception of international organisation being comprised by an 
architecture in which thing-like entities called organisations perform pre-
formulated functions that can be explored through simulation. The final step 
consists in an attempt at contextualising the meaning-making activities of student 
and academic internationalists with a view to the value and principle of 
professionalism that motivates them to represent the world of international 
relations and organisation in a specific fashion – and not in another.  
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 This may be termed the sociological dimension of culture that is embodied in political, 
economic, legal, familial and still other institutions that constrain and direct attitudes, ideas, and 
practical inclinations of those who partake in discourse/s. Cf. Norman Fairclough, Discourse and 
Social Change (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), at p. 64.  
12
 I entertain here what has become a commonsense understanding of ‘discourse’, one that 
is in vital respects similar to the one Michel Foucault has outlined in “The Discourse on Language”, 
appended to Archaelogy of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1970), pp. 
215-237, and Power/Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1980). The writings of associates within the 
Ideology and Discourse Analysis Programme in the Department of Government at the University of 
Essex, such as those of David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, “Introducing Discourse Theory and 
Political Analysis”, in: D. Howarth, A.J. Norval & Y. Stavrakakis (eds.), Discourse Theory and 
Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies, and Social Change (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2000), pp. 1-23, have made good use of this concept in the study of political phenomena. 
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Mike in Wonderland  
 
The staff and student participants who annually gather at Model International 
Organisation Conferences place great value in simulating what they take to be the 
inner workings of international organisations. They seem to believe that seeing the 
world from inside the conference room bears out how actual diplomats and 
delegates behave in problem-oriented discussions about pressing issues. Together 
with many academic internationalists who profess to ‘theorise’ about international 
organisations but who see themselves as pragmatic problem-solvers just the same, 
they perceive the procedural frameworks of international organisations as 
instrumental for the handling of urgent problems in an efficient, effective, and 
legitimate fashion. Aimed at doing good through actively partaking in the making 
of international order, they define themselves as pragmatic functionaries who 
govern the world through rational means. What is crucial here, membership in this 
circle of like-minded fellows13 fosters typical and fairly predictable communication 
habits that allow for meaningful exchange among student internationalists and that 
discursively constitute the object domain of international organisation, at this 
aggregate level, in a particular fashion. Consider the following interview with Mike 
Reed whom I regard as a typical student delegate to a National Model United 
Nations Conference: 
 
“[…] 
 
Why did you participate in the model UN? 
 
I’m soon to be finished my Bachelor’s degree in Political Science at the University 
of Victoria. International relations has been a significant area of study in my 
undergrad education, so to actually put my knowledge into practice at the Model 
United Nations Conference in New York seemed like a great opportunity. I have 
known about the UN Club at UVic for a few years now, but I hadn’t joined in 
previous years because I thought it would be too time consuming with all the 
planning, fundraising, and studying that is required leading up to the conference. I 
went for it this year because I realized it would be my last chance to do it before I 
graduated and the experience would significantly open my eyes wider than what I 
was learning in the classroom. 
 
What interests you most about international diplomacy? 
 
The notion of peace. International diplomacy is there to provide a safe world and to 
prevent violence and injustice. With 193 sovereign states on the planet, 
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 I infer the similarity of outlook in factual and normative respects from a survey of twenty 
letters of motivation that German student internationalists have attached to their applications for a seat 
at a delegation to the National Model United Nations Project in New York in 2008.  
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international diplomacy is absolutely crucial to global stability and maximization 
of peace. 
 
What are some challenges you found when participating in the model UN?  
 
The international system is extremely complex. Each country in the UN tries to 
push their own agenda, while simultaneously fulfilling their commitment to peace 
and cooperation. What is difficult about international diplomacy is getting all the 
dynamics to align. UVic was representing the Republic of Korea (South Korea) at 
NMUN this year and my particular role was a delegation to the UN in the 
Conference on Disarmament. To give you an example of the challenges I faced in 
my conference, I was trying to persuade the United States of America to work 
multilaterally and cooperatively, rather than aggressively sanctioning nuclear 
capable countries like North Korea. Inside the conference room there were other 
difficulties, like students who were taking the simulation a little bit too seriously, 
causing emotional tension at times. Particularly the delegates representing both 
Israel and Syria were at each other’s throats, which made it difficult to get through 
the voting process and pass our resolutions. If countries are not getting along, it can 
be devastating to the development of resolutions. 
 
Any amazing moments you had down in New York that altered your perspective or 
expanded your mind? 
 
I felt the most inspired during the opening and closing ceremonies of the 
conference, which took place inside the UN headquarters. Some of the speakers 
were high profile individuals from the UN talking to us students about our future 
and our responsibility to play a role as individuals toward a more peaceful world. I 
was sitting in the same room where major decisions get made that have enormous 
impacts on our world. For the first time I could see that I had the opportunity and 
capability to contribute to a better world.”14 
 
The goings-on in the mock conference session and the student delegate’s 
sense of mission are both premised on the sincere want to make the world a better 
place. Bequeathed with a sense of dignity and confidence, the average student 
delegate deems his task to assume responsibility and contribute his share to a more 
peaceful world. From the perspective of the student participant, actively partaking 
in multilateral diplomacy may help to prevent violence and injustice. For 
diplomacy within the conference room serves global stability and the maximisation 
of peace. Yet, while busying himself with making the world a better place through 
conference diplomacy, the average student delegate is in a distinct sense separated 
from both the objects he apprehends and from the contexts within which he is 
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 http://www.bravenewtraveler.com/2007/04/10/lessons-from-the-united-nations-an-
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apprehending them. He discusses issues concerning, for example, ‘disarmament’ in 
a normative and problem-oriented fashion. But while doing this, he seems entirely 
liberated from the very forces that usually meddle in the real-world situation of an 
official meeting. Neither does he sense any strictures that usually come with 
allegiances, rivalries, and competing appraisals concerning possible solutions 
amongst other represented countries. Nor does he recognise himself as an active 
participant in a more encompassing process of allocating life and death. From the 
perspective of the student delegate, the issues to be dealt with require some 
willingness on all sides to get along peacefully, to observe diplomatic etiquette, and 
to not hamper the voting process so that a resolution can be passed. By seeing 
himself and his peers largely unconstrained of forces that diplomats and delegates 
face in the institutional settings of international organisations, the typical student 
internationalist undertakes to solve problems through rational argumentation. 
Sublimating himself over emotional troubles that are often linked with questions 
regarding the assignment of deprivation undoubtedly has the advantage that the 
student delegate is able to retain his dignified self-image and confident sense of 
mission. Indeed, from the perspective of the student delegate, engaging his likes in 
rational discussions and to solve the most critical issues through consensus is 
greatly facilitated if he and other student delegates do not let them getting disturbed 
by outbursts of ‘emotional tension’. 
The average student delegate clings to the belief that he is free to define his 
goals in a relatively autonomous fashion and to procure rational solutions to pre-
formulated ends. This image of himself allows the internationalist-as-delegate to 
choose whatever position and strategy he/she deems appropriate vis-à-vis both the 
concrete issue at stake and possible courses of action in the field of multilateral 
diplomacy. When the internationalist-as-delegate enters diplomacy as a field of 
positions, he/she encounters facts, theories, ideas, or strategies as ready-made 
things whose value – or lack thereof – lies in their propositional content. Reducing 
complicated factual issues that form part of complex and protracted problems in 
real world settings to stabilised propositional forms serves the student 
internationalist in two ways: he/she is able to take the objects and events to which 
statements refer as ready-made patterned wholes, and he/she is in a position to 
subjugate these objects to a regime of rational control15. The various instances in 
the field of international organisation, such as bureaucratic procedures, delegates, 
and problems they deal with are thus available to be reproduced in a curtailed and 
miniaturized form so that they can be more easily engaged by mind and body16. 
                                                 
15
 Cf. Laura Zanotti, “Governmentalizing the Post–Cold War International Regime: The UN 
Debate on Democratization and Good Governance”, Alternatives, Vol. 30 (2005), pp. 461-487, at p. 
478 who asserts that modes of governance favoured by internationalists rhetorically “[…] foster 
standardized systems of control, monitoring mechanisms, and governing from a distance by 
international organizations.” 
16
 I mean here shortcuts such as ‚P5’ and ‚SC’ in ‘the’ UN; ‘Coreper’ and ‘Ecofin’ in ‘the’ 
EU; or ‘NACC’ and ‘P4P’ in ‘the’ NATO (at the beginning of the 1990s). The great appal of such 
shortcuts is not only that they allow for a more efficient exchange about relevant items among interns 
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The mock conference situation becomes not only available as ‘the’ GA, ‘the’ SC, 
and ‘the’ UN, but as a more intricate system in which multilateral diplomacy works 
like a soberly fine-tuned and tightly regulated mechanism towards preferred states 
like ‘stability’ and ‘peace’ of the ‘international system’. Simplified representations 
of this sort are then amenable to be controlled by transferring them from one 
context to another, say from the issue area of ‘security’ to the one of ‘trade’ and 
then maybe to ‘development’.  
The problem with this position is that the student delegate is able to retain 
this wonderful vision about making the world a better place only to the extent to 
which he imagines himself as participant in a rather unrealistic situation. To be 
sure, the problem is not that the student delegate thinks and acts on decidedly 
normative premises. For any well meaning internationalist like myself, aspiring to 
peace, progress, and social justice is a fully respectable stance. Yet what is 
inherently problematic about the liberal simulation project is the almost total lack 
of awareness on the side of the average student delegate about what the narrow 
conference setting of an international organisation actually stands for. What the 
student delegate fails to understand is that the very same rhetoric that he encounters 
within a conference setting, and that he deems suited to bring about peace, 
progress, and social justice, is tailored to the conference setting that he simulates. 
What goes on in this conference setting, however, is only a tiny fracture of 
multilateral diplomacy, which is highly complex, emotionally laden, and 
vigorously contested inasmuch as it is the pattern by which the distribution and 
institutional allocation of life and death is rationalised and ultimately legitimated. 
By leaving completely out of consideration that the official rhetoric of peace, 
progress, and social justice is actually tied to institutional structures and processes 
in and through which it attains a meaning that is specific for this official and 
hermetically shielded context, the typical student delegate fails to understand that 
he tends above all else to project his own fantastic image of what multilateral 
diplomacy is about in this rhetoric17. The typical student delegate deems peace, 
progress, and social justice popular currents that are only a few steps away. For 
diplomats and delegates in the real world, however, there is more often than not 
barely a minimum of consensus about what peace, progress, and social justice 
might actually mean in the state of crisis that has become such a pervasive 
condition of modern international relations.  
What is relevant for the purposes of this article is the fact that, however 
much the average student delegate may think of himself as an individual that 
chooses in a rational fashion what he deems useful for the establishment of peace, 
                                                                                                                            
to the respective setting; they also convey a sense of membership to an exclusive circle of competent 
professionals. 
17
 Cf. Jacques Fomerand, “Recent UN Textbooks: Suggestions from an Old-Fashioned 
Practitioner”, Global Governance, Vol. 8 (2002), pp. 383-403, at p. 392: “Notwithstanding the verbal 
niceties of multilateral diplomacy, the struggle for power within the UN for control of its agenda is 
what fuels the system. The means vary with one’s position in the international pecking order. […] 
Multilateralism at the UN is fed by the dynamics of unequal power relationships that determine who 
gets what and how as well as who will be treated as a subject or an object of international relations.”  
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progress, and social justice, he shares in a disposition and exhibits a cognition that 
is characteristic of a great many student internationalists who have by and large the 
same rosy image of international relations and organisation. Their collectively 
shared sense and cognition motivates them to foster peace, progress, and social 
justice through diplomatic conventions that they deem operative in the real world. 
And it is the very same collectively shared sense and cognition which leads them to 
think that they share in the same outlook as real world diplomats. They do not 
reckon with the fact that their perspective is enormously different from the one of 
the practitioner. Their pragmatic liberal take on things leads many of them to view 
the world as a coherent whole that looks more or less the same from whatever 
viewpoint. And they seem convinced that urgent real-world phenomena are most 
appropriately re-presented by recourse to concepts and categories that form part of 
the vocabulary that diplomats and delegates use in official settings. What many 
student internationalists fail to recognise is that the idiom they avail themselves of 
when they enter the conference room is at this very moment pressed into the 
service of their own normative belief. They conceptually categorise every instance 
of international organisation as an elementary part in a web of systematic 
relationships that has instrumental value for the attainment of pre-formulated 
normative ends that are ultimately their own. Understanding the instrumental value 
of international organisations and to be in control over their applications yields of 
course desirable, and reliable, products. But the images and ideas upon which they 
rest are not so much grounded in the real world of international relations as they 
are grounded in the normative desire of privileged Western students to 
internationalise the bureaucracy of public administration that they have learned to 
see as a practical and a-political solution for every imaginable social problem.  
Many student internationalists tend to think of themselves as very liberal, 
given that they are very peace-oriented, very progressive, and very pro-justice. Yet, 
student internationalists end up approaching the object domain of international 
relations and organisation in a rather conservative fashion. My own exposure to the 
inner life of organisations together with my teaching experience over the last 
couple years have fed my impression that students are on average not inherently 
suspicious vis-à-vis the institutional architecture of international organisation and 
do not favour radical change. They know about dramatic failures on a global scale 
but draw no connection between problems and institutions. They fervently support 
the operation of existing procedures as the best means to arrest the political that 
they think looms under the surface of national interests threatening the order in-
place. In their view, international organisations function as mechanisms that 
establish peace, progress, and social justice through rational problem-oriented 
discussions. Participation in the diplomatic functions of international organisations 
is tantamount to promoting noble purposes. My point here is that, because they 
identify so enthusiastically with what they perceive as the good work of 
professionals within international organisations, and because they subscribe to 
goals that they deem transparent and sought for by diplomats and delegates, 
internationalists understand themselves not as astute, let alone critical, observers of 
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international relations and organisation. They think of themselves as loyal 
supporters of what they deem well-meaning activities, and celebrate, at times 
enthusiastically, the machinery of existing international organisations as arenas in 
which these activities are presumably at home.  
It may of course be objected that student internationalists are a quite 
heterogeneous group, if only because they are from many different countries. It 
may thus be deemed unlikely that they all share the same sense, the same 
cognition, and the same conservative approach. And this is certainly true to a 
certain extent. Yet, student internationalists around the globe are increasingly alike 
in that they grow out of, and then into, very similar settings. They thus come to 
share very similar cognitive categories and ways of thinking that narrow their 
perspective on abstract and formal entities, that frame their preoccupations with 
distinct purposes, and that define their approach as one that is liberal and pragmatic 
in a very peculiar sense. They converge around a rationalist apprehension of things 
and deem it possible to realise states of peace, progress, and social justice that they 
have had the opportunity to know from their own experience in sheltered 
environments. The phenomena that many student internationalists perceive as 
pertinent to the field of international relations and organisation come in distinct 
object-forms such as constitutional documents, organs, committees, conferences, 
programs, resolutions, decisions, missions, monitoring, compliance, sanctions etc. 
which are held against problems such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, human rights 
violations and what have you. Insofar as student internationalists deal with 
phenomena that lend themselves to be represented as issues, negotiations, 
decisions, resolutions, and outcomes, the relevant object domain of international 
relations and organisation attains a formal ontology that accords with the view of 
government residing in public administration, and governance operating as neutral 
machine-like mechanism. Problems are cast as threats to normatively warranted 
and institutionally sanctioned purposes. By organising their doing under the same 
epistemic principles, the same factual considerations, and the same normative goals 
that they think correspond with those of the organised world community at large, 
internationalists may differ as far as their geographical location is concerned. Yet 
they nevertheless form a quite homogenous group as regards the ontology they 
presuppose and what it takes to be making the world a better place.  
A very critical aspect of the problem lies in the forces that constitute and 
reproduce this homogeneity. At issue is the invisible college, or network, of 
academic internationalists that shapes the cognitive and sense-making activities of 
many student internationalists. Available course syllabi and textual products are 
very similar as far as referential objects and their interrelations are concerned. They 
exhibit patterns, which impose cognitive constraints that many student 
internationalists do not interrogate, out of ignorance or mere lack of time. Many 
student internationalists come to accept the dominant conceptions of social reality 
and buy into prevailing frames that lead them to ascribe meaning to international 
relations and organisation in a particular fashion. I shall now point out that and 
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how this network of academic internationalism operates as a system of social 
inscription18. 
 
Academic Internationalism: the Fabric of (Conservative) Cognitive Frames 
 
Academic internationalists all over the world are busy with communicating 
conceptual notions and producing texts that are mainly responsible for the 
perception that student internationalists bring to the object domain of international 
relations and organisation. Said texts and courses, plus the many research 
programmes at graduate and postgraduate levels, constitute a dense ‘web of 
significance’ in and through which student internationalists are endowed with 
cognitive frames that spur their meaning-making activities. It will turn out highly 
suggestive to look more closely upon some knots and focal points that academic 
internationalists fix through their activities, and that exert such a strong formative 
influence upon students. My focus is upon the conceptual notions of ‘agency’, 
‘mission’/‘mandate’, and ‘performance’ of international organisations to which 
academic internationalists have attached characteristic figurative understandings.  
 
The Concept of Agency  
 
The perhaps most important discursive move on the way to conceive international 
organisation as an entity in its own right is to attribute agency to ‘it’, i.e. to first 
talk and write some ‘it’ into existence with the help of a noun, and to then make 
this very same ‘it’ active for analytical purposes. A vital step on the way is to come 
up with a category of actor, like the concept of collective actor, which can be 
perceived as bounded and unified. In many writings of academic internationalists, 
said ‘it’ stands for a thing-like entity that has some sort of corporate personality 
and that serves the purpose that agency can be ascribed to it. This move is pretty 
widespread in the network of academic internationalists. Consider the following 
statement in a known introductory textbook to what is called ‘international 
organization’: “Thus the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union and 
NATO are international organizations because they can function as or like 
collective actors. In their instrumental capacity, international organizations 
function as quasi-actors [sic!], often at the bidding of their most powerful member 
states.”19 The mechanism in and through which international organisations come 
                                                 
18
 The notion that the network of internationalists operates as an institution that 
contextualises and socialises students of international relations and organisation resonates with the 
views of Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: 
Doubleday, 1966), at p. 59-61, on the one hand, and Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations 
(Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995), at p. 9-11, on the other.  
19
 Volker Rittberger & Bernhard Zangl, International Organization: Polity, Politics and 
Policies (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2006), at p. 7. In the same vein, cf. Margaret P. Karns & Karen A. 
Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2004), at p. 17: “In considering the significance of IGOs in shaping global 
governance, we focus not on the structural attributes and programs but on the organizations as 
actors.” 
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into existence as actors that are endowed with the capacity to function as agents in 
their own behalf is often named ‘delegation’20. The EU, for instance, is portrayed 
by internationalists as an actor that has agency to the extent to which states have 
granted it the competence to decide on certain matters in a more or less 
autonomous fashion21. The same goes for ‘the’ WTO and/or ‘the’ IMF22. To be 
sure, liberal internationalists have exhibited more and more sophistication as they 
have differentiated between large collective actors, like the UN or the EU, and the 
special organisations or organs of which they are composed. The latter putatively 
have agency, too, an interesting question pertaining to the leeway that these 
organisations and organs have within the respective system, and vis-à-vis states. 
Internationalists have thus conceived the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, or 
the UN Conference on Trade and Development, as agents in their own right23. They 
have also depicted the European Commission and/or the European Parliament 
and/or the European Court of Justice as agents with the capacity to fulfil certain 
functions within, and sometimes even beyond, the range of competencies that has 
been granted to them by states through delegation24. The councils, panels, and 
commissions in the WTO, by contrast, are agents to which states have been much 
more reluctant to delegate far-reaching powers. For many, the typical reason 
underlying such a granting of power through delegation from states, in their 
capacity as principals, to organisations, in their capacity as agents, lies in the 
envisaged effects that the latter produce so as to benefit the former25. In this view, 
international organisations function as instruments for their principals once they, 
and their organs, have been instituted as agents.  
                                                 
20
 Delegation is a figurative understanding that often implies what has been dubbed a 
‘principal-agent-relationship’ between states as principals and organisations as agents. This concept 
and figurative understanding is particularly popular among adherents to rationalist theories of 
international organisation. Cf. Roland Vaubel, “Principal-agent Problems in International 
Organizations”, Review of International Organizations, Vol. 1 (2006), pp. 125-138.   
21
 Cf. Fabio Franchino, The Powers of the Union: Delegation in the EU (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
22
 Cf. Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nelson & Michael Tierney (eds.), 
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), especially the contributions of Lisa A. Martin and Erica R. Gould to the IMF, and the 
contribution of Andrew P. Cortell & Susan Peterson to the WTO. 
23
 Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, “The Attitude of States towards the Proliferation of 
International Organizations”, in: N.M. Blokker & H.G. Schermers (eds.), Proliferation of 
International Organizations: Legal Issues (The Hague: Kluwer, 2001), pp. 51-64, at p. 55.   
24
 Cf. the contributions to Mathias König-Archibugi (ed.), New Modes of Governance in the 
Global System: Exploring Publicness, Delegation, and Inclusiveness (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006); cf. Carl-Fredrik Bergström, Comitology: Delegation of Powers in the European 
Union and the Committee System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); and cf. Mark A. Pollack, 
The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), at p. 75-82, for a “[…] brief historical survey [which] demonstrates 
that questions of delegation and discretion were, in fact, explicit and central to the motivations of 
member governments in creating the basic institutions of the ECSC and its successors.” 
25
 This is obviously the so-called ‘functional’ explanation of delegation. Cf. Robert O. 
Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), at p. 80. 
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Other internationalists have deviated from this rationalist conception of 
agency as they have pointed out that international organisations are not so much 
directed by principals, as they evolve their own preferences and strategies26. Due to 
their alleged nature as bureaucratic complexes, international organisations such as 
the UN, for instance, are composed of various special organisations and 
administrative-executive units that formulate their own agendas and devise 
strategies how to realise them. They act themselves as principals vis-à-vis states27. 
In this view, international organisations are not so much agents that act on behalf 
of principals, they are rather agents that work back on states insofar as they change 
their preferences or influence their strategies, in a recursive manner as it were. 
Irrespective of their affiliation with this or that camp, internationalists do generally 
show some caution in that they are hesitant to ascertain agency in too general a 
fashion. Some take into consideration that it matters what international 
organisations are actually concerned with. It has thus been asked whether, for 
example, the United Nations is an important or marginal actor as regards the 
management of more specific issues in the field of international peace and 
security28, or what specific international organisations accomplish in distinct issue 
areas, ranging from peace and security over economic issues to social and 
humanitarian activities29. Yet, the important point here is that academic 
internationalists tend to champion some notion of international organisations being 
agents, either in that they infer agency from the functions that international 
organisations fulfil for states, in that they infer agency from a constructive role of 
international organisations as more or less autonomous actors, and/or in that they 
bear in mind the specificity of the issue area in which they are involved as actors. 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Cf. Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of 
International Organizations”, International Organization, Vol. 53 (1999), pp. 699-732, at p. 707. “IOs 
can become autonomous sites of authority, independent from the state ‘principals’ who may have 
created them, because of power flowing from at least two sources: (1) the legitimacy of the rational-
legal authority they embody, and (2) control over technical expertise and information. […] Since 
rational-legal authority and control over expertise are part of what defines and constitutes any 
bureaucracy (a bureaucracy would not be a bureaucracy without them), the autonomy that flows from 
them is best understood as a constitutive effect, an effect of the way bureaucracy is constituted, 
which, in turn, makes possible (and in that sense causes) other processes and effects in global 
politics.” 
27
 Cf. Martha Finnemore, “International Organizations and Teachers of Norms: The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy”, International 
Organization, Vol. 47 (1994), pp. 565-598, for an explication of how bureaucratic organs may act as 
‘norm teachers’ vis-à-vis states; and cf. Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, Rules for the 
World: International Organization in Global Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), and 
especially pp. 121-155 with an explication of how the UN-Secretariat operated in an autonomous 
fashion vis-à-vis the UN-Security Council as it (mis-)directed the Peacekeeping forces in Rwanda in 
1994, and as it withheld information from the Security Council’s Permanent Members.  
28
 Cf. Keith Krause, “Facing the Challenge of Small Arms: The UN and Global Security 
Governance”, in: Richard M. Price & Mark W. Zacher, The United Nations and Global Security 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 21-38. 
29
 Cf. the contributions to Diehl, op. cit., pp. 167-466. 
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The Concept of Mission/Mandate 
 
For internationalists, international organisations are typically created through 
signature and ratification of constitutional documents such as covenants and 
charters30. International organisations are thus grounded in rational-legal 
arrangements that define the overall ‘mission’ and that ascribe certain powers that 
are suited for the realisation of this mission. The particular purposes for which a 
specific international organisation has been created, and/or the specific ends for 
which governments take recourse to it as an agent, can allegedly be inferred from a 
look at said constitutional documents31. What is thus hypostatised by academic 
internationalists is that organisations are instituted and maintained by their 
sponsors so as to instantiate specific states of affairs, as they are described in 
official texts. In the case of the EU, for instance, “[…] the 1957 EEC Treaty was 
the founding ‘constitutional document’ of the European Community, and has since 
been amended numerous times, most notably in three landmark treaties: the 1986 
Single European Act (SEA), the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, and 
the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam.”32 The basic objectives, as they have been 
formulated in what may be seen as the ‘Preamble’ to the EEC Treaty, are the 
promotion of peace, economic and social progress, and liberty through (economic) 
integration. These goals, in turn, are to be realised through intergouvernemental 
cooperation and the delegation of decision-making powers to what are nowadays 
known as the Commission and the Council of Ministers. In the case of the UN, the 
primary purpose of this organisation, as set out in its Charter, has been the 
maintenance of international peace and security33, other goals such as criminal 
justice, democracy, human rights, or economic and social progress being secondary 
to, and dependent for their realisation on, this primary purpose. When 
internationalists give meaning to the WTO, they often point out that it came into 
existence as an organisation with the agreement finalizing the so-called Uruguay 
Round, which was signed in Marrakesh in 1994 and subsequently approved by the 
legislatures of most member countries34. The WTO, as an agent in its own right, 
replaced the multilateral trading regime of the GATT in 1995 by writing forth the 
regime’s basic purposes, such as raising living standards, ensuring full 
employment, increasing real income and effective demand, and assuring the full 
use of the resources of the world by expanding the production and exchange of 
                                                 
30
 Cf. Rittberger & Zangl, op. cit., at p. 63: “In general, international organizations are set 
up by a treaty between three or more states. Such treaties are frequently negotiated at diplomatic 
conferences before being signed and the ratified upon approval by the competent organs of each 
signatory state.” Cf. Niels M. Blokker, “Proliferation of International Organizations: An Exploratory 
Introduction”, in: Blokker & Schermers, op. cit., pp. 1-49, at p. 12. 
31
 Cf. Robert W. Gregg & Michael Barkun (eds.), United Nations System and its Functions: 
Select Readings (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1968), at p. 5-6. 
32
 Cf. Pollack, op. cit., at p. 83. 
33
 Cf. Nigel D. White, The United Nations System: Toward International Justice (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2002), at p. 12-13 and pp. 139-172.  
34
 Cf. Elaine Hartwick & Richard Peet, “Neoliberalism and Nature: The Case of the WTO”, 
Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science, 590 (2003), pp. 188-211, at p. 192. 
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goods through reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade. As an international 
organisation, it exists now primarily “[…] for the purpose of liberalizing trade 
across national boundaries”35 and to therewith promote economic and social 
progress. 
Again, my point here is that the missions and mandates internationalists 
deem relevant as guideposts for international organisations circumscribe states of 
affairs that are all but secretive, inherently desirable, and very appealing. 
Internationalists, that is, are by and large agreed that the covenants and charters by 
which international organisations are founded define goals such as peace, progress, 
and/or social justice that are inherently stable, widely known, and not subject to 
controversy. Their founders, and probably the inhabitants of the world at large, can 
thus be deemed loyal supporters of these goals. This means that, by virtue of their 
mandates, as they have been formulated in official legal texts, international 
organisations pursue goals that are not only transparent as regards their original 
meaning but highly desirable and legitimate in and of themselves. As a matter of 
those purposes and principles laid down at their foundations, international 
organisations are thus not to be seen as agents that pursue partisan political 
objectives. Precisely because their performance is predicated upon transparent, 
desirable, and inclusive normative ends, students learn to see international 
organisations as the portents in and through which the sectarian impulses of the 
political may be arrested, perhaps even overcome, in the daily procurement of 
peace, progress, and social justice. The extent to which academic internationalists 
belabour the notion that international organisations pursue highly desirable and 
legitimate ends correlates with the extent to which this idealised image of 
international relations and organisation is held to be natural and self-evident among 
students. 
 
The Concept of Performance 
 
Another focal point pertains to the extent to which international organisations, 
conceived as agents, succeed or fail in realising their putative goals. At issue is the 
notion of ‘performance, which is often tied to behavioural categories such as 
coordination, deliberation, negotiation, decision, implementation, compliance, 
mediation, administration, sanction and so on. Once internationalists have learned 
to conceive international organisations as agents of some sort, the most interesting 
question for them is what they actually do, meaning what typical steps they take to 
realise widely known pre-formulated ends. It so comes that many internationalists 
tend to focus upon decisions that they associate with clarification, coordination, 
and/or prescribing functions of international organisations36. Another widespread 
                                                 
35
 Ibid.  
36
 Cf. Darryl Robinson, “Defining ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ at the Rome Conference”, 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93 (1999), pp. 43-57; cf. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan 
Snidal, “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations”, in: Paul F. Diehl (ed.), The 
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tendency among internationalists is to conceive deliberation, information 
transmission, and decision-making activities, say, in the UN-Security Council as 
the most typical responses to threats to world peace and security37. Internationalists 
also ponder the performance of the UN in the very locales of crisis. Some 
investigate whether and to what extent long successful instruments such as UN-
peacekeeping are all of a sudden decried as outbursts of hypocrisy38. Others seek to 
uncover new trends in dealing with such crisis so as to identify moves that lend 
themselves to being subsumed under new referential terms39. Many 
internationalists seem persuaded that the instruments of the UN and other 
organisations are still ‘better’, and in any case more sufficient, than measures taken 
by individual states40. The same goes for the presumed sufficiency of efforts on the 
part of the EU, the IMF, and the G8 to coordinate the increase of participation in 
the world economy, or to orchestrate assistance policies in the name of economic 
and social progress41. Combining analysis with recommendations, many 
internationalists derive policy-oriented proposals from their inquiry of the 
performance of international organisations, say the IMF, for what they deem 
(more) adequate operative steps42.   
An issue that has recently gained a particular salience among 
internationalists is the ability of international organisations to meet new challenges 
in what is depicted as an efficient, effective, and legitimate manner43. This has led 
many internationalists to shift their attention to the ability of international 
organisations to effectuate improvements in their own organs and mechanisms. In 
the case of the UN, for instance, internationalists have been interested in the extent 
to which the organisation is actually able to fulfil functions necessary for the 
maintenance of peace and security in the new millennium. They thus ask for 
instruments that the UN may avail itself of to ameliorate its implementation 
functions44. As regards the EU, internationalists have queried not only the kind of 
reforms the EU should undertake and whether they suffice to attain greater 
                                                                                                                            
Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 9-43, at p. 18. 
37
 Cf. Alexander Thompson, “Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of 
Information Transmission”, International Organization, Vol. 60 (2006), pp. 1-34, emphasising the 
‘neutrality’ of IOs as a crucial enabling condition for their serving as informative agents of the 
international community at p. 7.  
38
 Cf. Michael Lipson, “Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?”, European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 13 (2007), pp. 5-34.  
39
 Cf. Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O’Donnell & Laura Sitea, “Peacebuilding: 
What Is in a Name?”, Global Governance, Vol. 13 (2007), pp. 35-58.  
40
 Cf. Greg Mills, “Better with the UN? Searching for Peace and Governance in Iraq”, 
Global Governance, Vol. 10 (2004), 281-288.  
41
 Cf. Aaron Segal, “Managing the World Economy”, International Political Science 
Review, Vol. 11 (1990), pp. 361-369, at p. 366.  
42
 Cf. David Dode & John Murray, “The Evolving International Monetary Order and the 
Need for an Evolving IMF”, Global Governance, Vol. 12 (2006), pp. 361-372, pointing at p. 365 on 
‘new’ suitable strategies of “[…]surveillance, lending, representation, and governance.” 
43
 Cf. Karns & Mingst, op. cit., at pp. 514-520. 
44
 Cf. C.S.R. Murthy, “New Phase in UN Reforms: Establishment of the Peacebuilding 
Commission and Human Rights Council”, International Studies, Vol. 44 (2007), pp. 39-56.  
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effectiveness, transparency, and accountability, they have also asked for the 
impetus lying underneath the reform proposals concerning the EU’s organs45 and 
procedures46. With respect to the WTO, internationalists ask whether the envisaged 
reform measures succeed to streamline the organisation’s decision-making 
procedures so that its primary purposes of social and economic progress may 
further be enhanced through procedures that combine considerations of democratic 
legitimacy with those of operative efficiency47. Internationalists championing a 
more analytic and explanatory research interest seek to find out why international 
organisations decide to undergo protracted reform processes to begin with; the 
prevailing opinion, namely that the states who founded these organisations are 
typically the main driving forces behind these reforms as they exert pressure from 
outside, is more and more faced with a rival hypothesis that stresses endogenous 
forces48.  
 Taken together, internationalists entertain a variety of classificatory moves 
to represent the performance of international organisations in a fashion that coheres 
with their understanding of international organisations as agents realising 
normative ends. The writings of internationalists suggest that international 
organisations engage in activities that may not always be entirely sufficient for the 
establishment of pace, progress, and social justice. Yet they seem nevertheless 
agreed that they are designed to serve the overarching goal to bring order to a 
world that is deficient in this precise regard. The point here is that these and some 
other focal points, concepts, and figurative understandings impose constraints upon 
the meaning-making activities of student internationalists in that they frame their 
imagination of what issues are to be judged interesting and relevant for the 
purposes of theorising and research. This can be grasped with a view to what said 
focal points, concepts, and figurative understandings rule out systematically.  
 
                                                 
45
 In this regard, cf. Michelle Cini, Reforming the European Commission: Discourse, 
Culture and Planned Change, in: M.O. Hosli, A. van Deemen & M. Widgren, Institutional Challenges 
in the European Union (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 1-21, placing much weight upon the gradual 
evolution of a ‘new governance discourse’ within the EU at large;  
46
 Annick Laruelle, “The EU Decision-Making Procedures: Some Insight from Non-
Cooperative Game Theory”, in: ibid., pp. 89-112, emphasising the importance of how decision-
making procedures within the EU are designed and whether the Council of Ministers and/or the 
European Parliament may thus avail themselves of the possibility to perform as veto-players. 
47
 See generally Andreas R. Ziegler & Yves Bonzon, “How to Reform WTO Decision-
making? An Analysis of the Current Functioning of the Organization from the Perspectives of 
Efficiency and Legitimacy”, NCCR Trade Working Paper, No. 2007/23 (2007).  
48
 Unpersuaded by principal-agent theories that point at control measures that states apply to 
organisations, Catherine Weaver & Ralf J. Leiteritz, “Our Poverty is a World Full of Dreams: 
Reforming the World Bank”, Global Governance, Vol. 11 (2005), pp. 369-388, explain reforms in the 
World Bank with reference to its ‘organizational culture’ and path-dependent effects; in a similar 
vein, Sylvia Ostry, “The World Trading System: In the Fog of Uncertainty”, Review of International 
Organizations, Vol. 1 (2006), 139-152, emphasises that and how unintended consequences which 
made themselves felt during the Uruguay Round changed the system in such a fashion that 
governments had to ponder questions as to how the weak executive and legislative functions of the 
WTO could be strengthened. 
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The Conceptual Void 
 
Ponder the conjecture that there is actually not much to be enthusiastic about 
international relations and organisation. Let us take official rhetoric as just that. Let 
us then say that there has of late been no path-breaking achievement, no 
noteworthy success, no reliable solution which can be attributed to international 
organisations as agents. Let us assert that the goings on within ‘the’ UN, ‘the’ EU, 
‘the’ WTO, ‘the’ WB, ‘the’ IMF and so on reveal enormous difficulties that these 
international organisations naturally have in resolving issues they are often 
expected to successfully deal with. Let us further maintain that ‘the’ UN has 
‘normally’ been sidestepped by the great powers in situations that they considered 
vital to them; that ‘the’ EU has at no point in history been rooted in a loyal 
European constituency, but that it has instead been confronted with growing 
popular dissatisfaction about its exaggerated emphasis upon the liberalisation of the 
common market, the democratic deficit of its decision-making procedures, and the 
premature promotion of a constitutional project that nobody wants and 
understands; and that negotiations in ‘the’ WTO have not been smoothly operating 
catalysts of economic progress and social justice, but that they have increasingly 
been deadlocked because they have intensified the scale of deprivation in the so-
called ‘South’. These organisations, plus ‘the’ WB and ‘the’ IMF, have actually 
had enormous difficulties to act on their own behalf, to evolve procedures and push 
agendas in the name of peace, progress, and social justice, to effectuate the very 
outcomes for which they had originally been instituted. Liberal internationalists, 
students and academics alike, have been silent on these more deeply rooted issues. 
Their faithful and pragmatic stance vis-à-vis international organisations has led 
them to deny fundamental defects and how they have become manifest in 
systematic failures of organisations. At the very same time when journalists and 
free-lancers made names for themselves with shocking stories about the 
involvement of international organisations in the aggravation of crises49, 
internationalists have preferred to view international organisations in a more 
positive light50. 
This claim may seem somewhat exaggerated. It may be countered that, 
however well the conceptual void describes the meaning-making activities of some 
internationalists, it is not applicable to the great majority of internationalists. The 
latter, it could be maintained, differ in outlook and argumentative style. Compared 
                                                 
49
 Weaving her accounts of how international organisations failed to prevent mass killings 
at various occasions in a story of US-Foreign Policy, cf. Susan Power, A Problem from Hell: America 
and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002); reconstructing the prehistory that 
eventually culminated in the Rwanda genocide by shedding a particular light on activities of ‘the’ 
WB, ‘the’ IMF and ‘the’ UN and some its special organisations, cf. Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to 
Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (London: Verso, 2004); and cf. Adam Lebor, Complicity with Evil: 
United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 
50
 As a typical example, cf. Dirk Forman & Dirk Segaer, “New Coalitions for Global 
Governance: The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism”, Global Governance, Vol. 12 (2006), pp. 
205-225. 
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with the overtly principled and dogmatic internationalism of some, it may be 
argued, the great bulk of liberal internationalism has overall been more reasonable, 
more reflective, more serious, and more balanced. The majority usually recognise a 
disjunction between the ideal and the real, which comes to the fore whenever they 
point at shortcomings of international organisations. Internationalists, it may be 
further stressed, are actually relentlessly critical of their study objects in that they 
lament deficiencies in agency, purpose, and performance of international 
organisations. Admittedly, there are internationalists who recognise said 
disjunction, openly or tacitly. A fair number of internationalists have overall been 
sensitive to imperfections as regards autonomy, efficiency, effectiveness and/or 
legitimacy on the side of international organisations51. So in a sense, the 
aforementioned objection is on target. There are liberal internationalists who are 
reasonable, reflective, serious, and balanced in their estimations. And some are 
even critical. However, the objection fails to reckon with the fact that criticism of 
international organisations is generally modest as it is usually tailored to, and put in 
the service of, loyal support for these very same international organisations52. This 
is so in two interrelated respects.  
Criticism is usually annexed to some larger scholastic project, say rational 
or sociological institutionalism, for instance. If academics tackle normative 
questions at all, they are more often than not aimed at the maintenance, perfection, 
or reform of international organisations, conceived as entities in their own right. 
                                                 
51
 Interrogating legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN in the area of administration, cf. 
David Harlan, “Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration”, Global Governance, 
Vol. 10 (2004), 15-19; criticising the effectiveness of UN-peacemaking in post-Cold War conflict 
situations, cf. Christopher Clapham, “Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking”, Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 35 (1998), pp. 193-210, and Mats Berdal, “The United Nations, Peacebuilding, and 
the Genocide in Rwanda”, Global Governance, Vol. 11 (2005), pp. 115-130; criticising the record of 
the UN in providing humanitarian assistance, cf. Nicholas J. Stockton, “The Failure of International 
Humanitarian Action in Afghanistan”, Global Governance, Vol. 8 (2002), pp. 265-271; pointing at 
rather severe setbacks in the WTO’s trade negotiations, cf. Rorden Wilkinson, “Crisis in Cancún”, 
Global Governance, Vol. 10 (2004), pp. 149-155; pointing at the consequences for countries in the 
‘South’, cf. Erfried Adam, “The WTO and the Crisis of Multilateralism: A Look at the Present 
Situation”, FES Briefing Paper (October 2004) and, by the same author, “Suspension of the World 
Trade Round – Multilateralism, Global Governance, and Development Policy in Crisis”, FES Briefing 
Paper (October 2006), either paper can be found at http://www.fes-
geneva.org/publicationsFrame.htm. Interrogating the effectiveness of international organisations more 
generally, cf. Barnett & Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations”, op. cit.; pondering legitimacy, cf. Jean-Marc Coicaud, “Reflections on International 
Organisations and International Legitimacy: Constraints, Pathologies, and Possibilities”, International 
Social Science Journal, Vol. 53, No. 170 (2001), pp. 523-536. 
52
 For two examples that affirm the rule, cf. Edward Newman, A Crisis of Global 
Institutions? Multilateralism and International Security (London: Routledge, 2007), and cf. Geoff 
Simons, UN Malaise: Power, Problems and Realpolitik (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1995). Both authors 
conclude their at times relentlessly critical, fascinating and highly perceptive treatises with well-
meaning suggestions for reform. For an exception that confirms the rule, see Hartwick & Peet, op. 
cit., who conclude their article on the WTO, at p. 210, with the call for ‘radical political action’ that 
combines two types of counterforce: “[…] the thousands of protestors willing to face systematic 
violence by the police and military protecting the existing global order and the hundreds of research 
institutions [sic!] and nongovernmental organizations dedicated to uncovering the sophisticated lies 
that global governance organizations persist in telling us.” 
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And those internationalists who eventually acknowledge that international 
organisations may not exactly fit the ideal representations they give of themselves 
usually arrive at a rehabilitative view. They eventually put reason, reflection, 
seriousness, and differentiation in the service of rehabilitation. Most importantly, 
their criticism is beholden to a project of rehabilitation for the existing architecture 
of international organisation. Liberal internationalists admit some disjunction 
between the self-image of international organisations on the one hand, and what 
they are and actually do on the other. They nevertheless point out that, in a 
foreseeable time, the international organisation of their choosing can be perfected 
and used to legitimately regulate, efficiently organise, and effectively administrate 
the realm of international relations out there. By this, internationalists play down 
the various patterns of impairment, subversion, blackmail, coercion, wheedling and 
other ‘political’ activities that are integral to the practice of international 
organisation53, and that critical observers have every reason to be sceptical about54. 
Yet their faithful rehabilitative stance leaves no other choice. Too frank an 
admission that institutional mechanisms of international organisations are deeply 
involved in generating problems all over would relegate them to the margins of the 
field. They thus prefer to add another analytic and formal piece that adumbrates 
agency, mission, and/or performance of international organisations as entities. So 
what many liberal internationalists habitually choose to do, for career-oriented 
considerations, is to deny the very possibility that the procedures and mechanisms 
of international organisations as entities are not essentially different from the very 
milieu that they are supposed to regulate and administrate. In their view, a 
scheduled, transparent, and procedurally fine-tuned multilateralism as it is tied to 
rational-legal bureaucracy is, in principle, there to order and regulate a power-
driven, egotistic, and arbitrary unilateralism of unfettered predatory. To downplay, 
disguise, or categorically rule out that the political has actually full control over the 
institutional architecture of international organisations is one way in which liberal 
criticism is in the service of international organisations.  
The other sort of criticism is usually rooted in an affirmative stance of the 
existing setup. Internationalists who admit that existing international organisations 
may not (yet) be perfectly suited to order and regulate the predatory world out there 
are nevertheless convinced that the machinery of international organisations may 
be trusted to effectuate peace, progress, and social justice, if not for this, then 
maybe for the next generation. It is in any case worthwhile to sustain faith in its 
                                                 
53
 Cf. The Road to Europe (2003), a movie sponsored and made possible by Fogh 
Rasmussen, Danish Prime Minister and then President of the European Council. The pictures show 
negotiations between Rasmussen and officials acting in the name of the EU Presidency, heads of state 
of EU members, and government representatives of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. What 
can above all else be grasped with a view at the negotiations in very exclusive settings is a great deal 
of cynicism on all sides that is impossible to be perceived as having anything to do with peace, 
progress, and social justice. 
54
 Cf. Brian Urquhart in a conversation with Harry Kreisler titled: “The United Nations 
After 9/11”, at October 4th, 2004, to be found at: http://www.uctv.tv/search-details.asp?showID=8870. 
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eventual operation55. Faithful academic internationalists endorse the actual 
operation of existing international organisations, precisely because it is not perfect 
yet. Their move is as much denial as it is affirmation. What is perhaps most crucial 
in this context, this affirmation of what liberal internationalists recognise as 
international organisation amounts to a stance that is not only immune to criticism, 
but that is downright conservative. Liberal internationalists champion at times a 
very pressing and urgent tone. They search for initiatives with the potential to make 
for another resolution or directive. They are vigilant about what goes on in the 
conference settings of existing international organisations. But this urgency only 
masks the solipsism and conservatism of their activist and argumentative 
enterprise.  
Consider the many lamentations, championed by representatives of 
underdeveloped countries in Latin America and Africa for decades, about the 
performance of ‘the’ UN as a system that constantly reproduces, and intensifies, 
the stratification of the globe56; consider the death of half a million Iraqi children as 
a ‘sorry but necessary’ by-product of the UN-supervised sanctions of Iraq57; 
consider the use of depleted uranium weapons by NATO forces during the hotly 
contested war in Kosovo58; consider the ‘cash for access’-agreements, negotiated 
between the European Commission and various West African coastal states, that 
favour above all else the interests of the European fisheries lobby and are 
detrimental for people and environment in the West African coastal region59; or 
consider the collapse of numerous large economies, such as the ones in Mexico and 
Argentina, after attempts by ‘the’ WB and ‘the’ IMF to structurally adjust and 
remodel them in the fashion of the crisis-ridden stagnant economies in the 
Western/ised world. The discourse of liberal internationalism is unable to open 
conceptual space by which it would become possible to actually understand 
phenomena and recognise the structural link between pervasive political and 
socioeconomic disasters on the one hand and the existing architecture of 
international organisations on the other. If viewed from the perspective of liberal 
internationalists, it always seems urgent, inevitable, sometimes even appealing, 
when they declare that occasional disruptions are necessary steps on the way to 
                                                 
55
 Cf. Oran Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless 
Society (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), concluding his chapter on global environmental governance through 
international organisations, at p. 182, with the statement that “[…] there is room for cautious 
optimism among students of international environmental affairs.” 
56
 Cf. Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro, “The United Nations and the Freezing of the 
International Power Structure”, International Organization, Vol. 26 (1972), pp. 158-168.  
57
 Cf. Paying the Price: Killing the Children of Iraq (2000), a documentary filmed by John 
Pilger that aims at illustrating that and how the sanctions on Iraq, imposed by ‘the’ UN and enforced 
by the forces of the US and Great Britain, have devastated millions of people, mostly civilians, and 
especially children. 
58
 The former Finnish environment minister, Pekka Haaivisto, allegedly declared in his 
capacity as head of a UN-sponsored mission to Kosovo that “[…] NATO disclosed having used 
31000 rounds of depleted uranium ammunition during some 100 missions throughout Kosovo by U.S. 
A-10 aircraft.” To be found at www.planetark.org/avantgo/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=6078.  
59
 Cf. Milan Ilnyckyj, “The Legality and Sustainability of European Union Fisheries Policy 
in West Africa”, MIT International Review, Vol. 1 (2007), 32-41.  
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peace, progress, and social justice. Yet the very things liberal internationalists 
perceive as urgent, inevitable, and even appealing seem utterly implausible, 
conservative, and ultimately dangerous from a critical perspective that is 
sympathetic with those who actually bear the consequences.  
The thing is, of course, that the project of liberal international organisation 
does not aspire to be appealing to those who actually suffer deprivation. Liberal 
internationalists are interested primarily, if not exclusively, in that their project 
finds approval by those who preside over the existing setup. Liberal 
internationalists try to see the world from the same perspective as those who run 
the institutions. This has the effect that their internationalism reproduces itself as 
the very discourse in and through which the architects of international organisation 
represent themselves as benevolent guardians of world order. Liberal 
internationalism is itself a performative enterprise as it aspires to be the very idiom 
in and through which official functionaries represent the operation, performance, 
reproduction, and proliferation of their bureaucratic practices. There is thus no 
point at lamenting about some mismatch between those instances of the real world 
that its adherents do not perceive and the world orders that they actually write and 
talk into existence. Liberal internationalism is the theory and practice of 
international organisation, a discourse that provides the vocabulary by which the 
powers-that-be normalise and aestheticise their distributing life and death. It is in 
this capacity that the discursive paradigm of liberal internationalism functions as 
the dominant meaning-making mechanism that fabricates the cognitive frames in 
and through which students make sense of international relations and organisation. 
The last section is devoted to bear out some enabling conditions that I think 
are responsible for the fact that internationalists approach international relations 
and organisation in the fashion that I have just sketched. My focus is directed at the 
formative context of internationalism, a setting over which their worldview 
assumes them to be in full control – even though it is exactly the other way round.  
 
A Critique of Liberal Internationalism 
 
Liberal internationalism and its project of international organisation is a culturally 
specific phenomenon that has to be understood as such. The decisive question 
concerns the elements that make for the culture under which liberal 
internationalists represent the architecture of international organisation(s) in the 
way they do. The first point of relevance in this regard is that the great majority of 
nowadays internationalists were born in upper and upper-middle class segments of 
Western/ised countries. They have witnessed a relatively peaceful period of 
enormous wealth creation and have enjoyed access to numerous economic, 
symbolic, and intellectual resources. Having otherwise proceeded through a series 
of very similar stations, from infancy to primary school and the institutions of 
secondary and postsecondary education, nowadays internationalists are convinced 
that the world they are confronted with is replete with opportunities, and that there 
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is no reason to be fundamentally opposed to anything60. This is coupled with a can-
do belief among the average internationalist that every problem can be solved by 
recourse to expert knowledge and coordinated specialised activities. By virtue of 
their similar familial and class backgrounds, liberal internationalists take the 
institutional setting for granted, share some predilection for personal achievement, 
and come to place much value in the liberal arts and professionally relevant 
knowledge as it is provided by disciplines such as law, political science, 
journalism, economics, or management. Being relatively privileged members of 
what they have known as peaceful and progressive societies that have undergone 
secularisation and ‘scientization’61, internationalists see themselves as rational 
beings that have grown out of religious superstitions, and that are free to realise 
themselves in societies in which there are equal opportunities. Their similar class 
backgrounds infuse them from an early stage with distinct ideas, norms, values, 
and principles that amount to a cultural code that is embodied in the conventional 
convictions prevailing in those institutions to which they turn as a matter of course. 
One element of said code is of foremost importance in this context. This is 
the value and epistemic principle of ‘professionalism’, which has come to operate 
as a fundamental orientation point and background condition in the meaning-
making activities of liberal internationalists. Also important, though somewhat less 
so, are values such as success, property, wealth, and production62. What renders the 
value and epistemic principle of professionalism so influential among members of 
the more privileged strata in Western/ised societies is its strong foothold in the 
schools and academic institutions to which its members turn for self-realisation. 
For this principle precludes that teachers and students define themselves and what 
they want in a manner that is not ipso facto influenced by all sorts of professional 
considerations63. Once they have entered the stage of secondary and post-secondary 
                                                 
60
 Cf. David Brooks, “The Organization Kid”, The Atlantic Monthly (April 2001), pp. 40-
54.  
61
 According to Drori & Meyer, op. cit., at p. 60, ‘scientization’ means that professional 
practices and everyday life are penetrated by “[…] principles of universal order (universality, scripts) 
and proaction (constituted actorhood). Scientization, through these cultural features, acts to restate 
authority in terms of rationalization and empowered actorhood. Scientized authority is anchored in 
institutionalized myths of scientific knowledge and in the stature of experts who create and possess 
this knowledge. Thus, scientized authority is more expansive than most traditional forms of political 
and economic control. Science has many properties in common with religion, and can easily be seen 
as a rationalistic form of religion in the age of (modern) globalisation.” 
62
 Cf. Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park: Sage, 
1990), at p. 104. 
63
 The most important question under a professional episteme is, of course: ‘for what career-
relevant purpose should this or that sort of thing be engaged and appropriated intellectually?’. The 
underlying assumption here is that curricula, once permeated by specific focal or reference points that 
may be associated with ‘professionalism’, function to delimit the range of possibilities for students to 
develop identities and to imagine desirable and realisable states of affairs. In a very similar vein, cf. 
Gero Lenhardt, Schule und bürokratische Rationalität (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984), at p. 170. My 
claim here is that ‘professionalism’ has not only become a central epistemic and ordering principle 
with regard to academic administration in a procedural sense, though I fully agree on this with 
William L. Waugh, “Issues in University Governance: More ‘Professional’ and Less Academic”, 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 585 (2003), pp. 84-96, 
especially pp. 89-94. It has become the foremost principle as far as academic administration is 
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education, students appropriate assumptions that are particularly vital with respect 
to the internationalist project: the supremacy of what goes as ‘empirical’ and at 
times even technical knowledge, comprised of shortcuts and formal concepts; and 
the association of functional expertise with the readiness to assume responsibility 
in the sense of exercising leadership and (paternalistic) policy-making. Precisely 
because it enjoys such a strong foothold in institutions of higher education to which 
access is restricted, the value and epistemic principle of professionalism engenders 
an attitude among those who do get access that they are supposed to exercise 
leadership and to entertain specific performances. This sense is often buttressed by 
mechanisms of gratification that reinforce not only their sense of excellence and 
leadership64, but that translate into an affirmative attitude vis-à-vis existing 
institutions and governance processes that are usually predicated on rationalist 
epistemologies65. Inasmuch as professionalism spurs the self-identification among 
students as practical problem-solvers who are to assume responsibility as 
functionaries within the existing setup, it supplies a pivotal formative impulse on 
the meaning-making activities of coming internationalists. 
The overarching importance of professionalism as a cultural force can be 
grasped with a view to the mechanisms behind its sedimentation. Consider the fact 
that institutions of postsecondary education have been firmly tied to other 
influential arenas of socio-cultural hemisphere of the Western/ised world, namely 
the big corporations on the one hand, and the various bureaucratic agencies of the 
state on the other66. As guardians of a specific socioeconomic fabric, corporate and 
state institutions work towards the maintenance of the status quo. They have 
elaborated a unique system of interrelated spaces that are all geared to the contours 
of a society that presumably thrives on technical skill-based production processes 
that are rationally designed and competently managed. Members of the more 
privileged and educated strata come to staff the places in which professional 
functionaries either preside over, or actively partake in, high-level processes of 
administration and/or management. These processes are themselves embedded in 
functional spaces that comprise the urban city as the site where vital economic and 
administrative functions are coordinated67; a more or less visible system of social 
stratification with a large enough force of white- and blue-collar workers; a private 
sphere sustained by civil rights; a system of general and higher education that 
                                                                                                                            
concerned in a substantive sense, i.e. with regard to what is being taught and discussed in class: 
empirical knowledge that is seemingly relevant and applicable for circumscribed job profiles within 
existing institutions. 
64
 Think only of the various foundations and institutions in nearly all Western/ised countries 
that offer coming ‘leaders’ financial support for internships and research projects, usually on the 
premise that they commit themselves to the philosophy of the lending institution.  
65
 Cf. Fischer, op. cit., at p. 106. 
66
 Cf. Klaus Türk, Die Organisation der Welt: Herrschaft durch Organisation in der 
modernen Gesellschaft (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994), at p. 222-223.  
67
 According to Michel Foucault, „Lecture from January 11, 1978“, in: M. Foucault, 
Sicherheit, Territorium, Bevölkerung. Geschichte der Gouvernementalität Bd. I (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 2006), pp. 13-51, at p. 36, the urban city gained importance as a locus at which to organise 
exchange relations between urban and rural areas as well as to plan and regulate economic growth. 
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serves to normalise and disseminate the values of the upper and upper-middle 
classes; and a web of institutions for scientific research and development whose 
primary aim is to yield findings that can be employed to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness of the system as it stands. The great universities, which reside in the 
latter two spaces, are obviously of critical importance. They administrate not only 
the various institutions of post-secondary institutions, they also provide the 
infrastructure within which corporations and the state are able to run educational 
programs that make the value and principle of professionalism operative as an 
identity-shaping force across the board of established knowledge domains68.  
That is, corporations and state institutions have found ways to play on the 
universities so as to mould a practical, technological, and for that matter uncritical, 
mindset amongst students. Due to the influence that state institutions and business 
corporations increasingly exert on the great universities69, higher education in the 
Western/ised world has come to be seen as preparation for the job70, not only in 
physics and engineering, but also – and all the more so – in management and public 
administration. Academic researchers in whatever ‘discipline’ seek integration in 
groups, or networks, that dedicate themselves to the generation of findings in 
answer to concerns about efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the existing 
setup. “The home of science and the professional schools, the university is the 
source of technocracy’s own reproduction. In recent years, moreover, universities 
have become top-heavy with technocratic training programs, particularly 
attributable to the growth of management education. Largely occurring at the 
expense of the nontechnocratic liberal arts, technocratically oriented programs have 
generated tensions that today run throughout university politics.”71 A technocratic 
outlook fuels the professional orientation of students and teachers. It thus operates 
as a psycho-cultural element that renders the concern about one’s own career the 
most fundamental disposition.  
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 Cf. Sheila Slaughter & Gary Rhoades, Academic Capitalism and the New Economy: 
Markets, States, and Higher Education (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2004), at p. 2: “When students 
graduate, colleges and universities present them to employers as output/product, a contribution to the 
new economy, and simultaneously define students as alumni and potential donors. Student identities 
are flexible, defined and redefined by institutional market behaviours.” Elaborating on this 
observation with regard to liberal arts education in the US, at p. 205: “Even within small, private, 
liberal arts colleges in the United States, there is evidence of a programmatic push toward the private 
marketplace, particularly in less prestigious colleges. In these institutions, which advertise an 
emphasis on liberal arts, the national pattern in the last two decades has been of growth in degree 
programs connected to employment in general and business in particular.”  
69
 To be sure, Stanley Aronowitz, The Knowledge Factory: Dismantling the Corporate 
University and Creating True Higher Learning (Boston: Beacon, 2000), has pointed out, at p. 16, that 
the “[…] university-corporate complex by 1900 […] was in full bloom.” Yet, as Matthew Ruben, 
“Penn and Inc.: Incorporating the University of Pennsylvania”, in: G.D. White & F.C. Hauck (eds.), 
Campus Inc. (Amherst: Prometheus, 2000), pp. 194-217, at p. 196, has elaborated, the new thing is 
that “[…] modern research universities are not simply becoming more influenced or ‘tainted’ by 
corporations [… they] are becoming for-profit corporations themselves.” 
70
 This break has aroused many sentiments in Germany, where the university has 
traditionally been considered as a place where intelligent young people were to be given the 
opportunity to actually study for maturation and character building.  
71
 Fischer, op. cit., at p. 39.  
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The institutionally sanctioned reproduction of a widely shared professional 
mindset began after the end of World War II and gained more and more 
momentum. Influential segments in Western industrial societies lobbied 
successfully for elevating empirical and problem-oriented over more fundamental 
and theoretical knowledge. The epithet ‘science’ became widely seen as a label for 
applying rather than developing ideas, of knowing how, not asking why. Not 
enough, accompanying this shift from basic to applicable knowledge was the 
strategy of collectivising research. It was already evident in the 1950s that 
“[a]mong Americans there is today a widespread conviction that science has 
evolved to a point where the lone man engaged in fundamental inquiry is 
anachronistic, if not fundamental inquiry itself.”72 This conviction has solidified in 
the Western/ised world at large, spurring numerous initiatives to transform 
educational institutions at secondary and post-secondary level into professional 
schools that disseminate practical and job-relevant skills rather than fundamental 
theoretical knowledge73. Social scientific knowledge, in particular, has come to be 
seen as a reservoir of formal theorems and technical formulas that may be 
translated into methodically designed inquiries by networks of researchers in 
highly funded ‘centres of excellence’ that devote themselves to the solution of 
problems functionaries – and not necessarily researchers – define for them. As a 
result, what is deemed valuable and useful knowledge comes more and more from 
practitioners and officials who are trusted as experts that know what is topical in 
respective settings74. 
My point here is that internationalists have appropriated worldviews, 
images, figures, themes, argumentative styles, and concepts qua being interns to a 
discursive process that has been located in particular institutional spaces. The value 
and principle of professionalism has supplied them with basic assumptions and 
overall focal points. They have thus adopted the worldview of functional elites that 
there is an international and/or global system out there which is amenable to be 
moulded through institutions and to be brought into desirable states-of-affairs. The 
perception that the attainment of such goals is occasionally hampered by the 
recurrence of problems does not lead internationalists to ponder whether existing 
institutions are somehow involved in generating these problems to begin with. 
Identifying with the problem-orientation of functionaries that staff these 
institutions, internationalists are convinced that what is needed is more efficient 
and effective involvement of these very same institutions. This is hardly surprising 
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 William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2002 [1956]), at p. 206.  
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 For an explication – and endorsement – of how this transformation is currently 
effectuated in Germany, cf. Reinhard Bader & Klaus Jenewein, „Professionalisierung für 
Berufsbildung sichern und erweitern“, Die Berufsbildende Schule, Vol. 56 (2004), pp. 9-16. 
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 Cf. Hans-Jochen Brauns, Private Hochschulen in Deutschland: Eine Bestandsaufnahme 
(Berlin, 2003) who points out that alone in Germany, there has been a remarkable increase of private 
universities such as the Hertie School of Government, the International University Bremen, the 
Bucerius Law School in Hamburg, the International University in Bruchsal, or the Munich Business 
School, where practitioners endow students with specialised and highly functional administrative, 
management, and/or legal skills. 
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since they see no value in systematic and theoretical knowledge about the 
genealogy of international organisation writ large75.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The great majority of internationalists, students and academics alike, end up 
simulating and representing a ‘reality’ that they have learned to celebrate because 
of their having been socialised in Western/ised settings and with the value and 
principle of professionalism. In my opinion, this value and principle makes for a 
dangerous focal point. I am thus deeply suspicious about claims who assert that and 
how simulation and analysis of functional performances of professionals bear out 
findings that international organisations are important pillars in global governance. 
This claim, together with the argument that international organisations are entities 
that are worth being felt and experienced in make-up settings of simulation 
conferences, makes sense only within the horizon of liberal internationalism. To be 
sure, what I find disquieting about the predominance and increasing popularity of 
liberal internationalism is not so much that it is so difficult to accept. My 
commitment to intellectual pluralism has so far worked effectively against the 
rejection of opinions for the reason that they are different from my own. It is rather 
the awful gnawing thought that meaning-making activities, which I think amount to 
denial, rehabilitation, affirmation, and celebration vis-à-vis the goings-on in the 
existing setup of international organisation, reveal a lack of serious ambition for 
the realization of peace, progress, and social justice. It is a pity that a rather shallow 
internationalist persuasion has become so widespread among students and 
academics alike. In my eyes, more and more student internationalists rush too early 
and uncritically into simulation. They are thus strongly enticed to pragmatically 
subordinate their ability to engage in substantive thought to the employment of 
artificial skills and niceties. They are led to abandon their curious stance as to how 
things actually operate and to endorse the aesthetics of an idealised image of 
international organisations and their activities, for the contours of which academic 
internationalists and their meaning-making activities bear the main responsibility. 
Given that truly worrisome activities performed from within international 
organisation/s are normalised and rationalised in this way, it is high time for 
everyone involved in nowadays internationalism to wonder what the social 
significance of simulating and celebrating the official rhetoric of professionals 
actually is. 
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 Cf. Steward A. Clegg, Modern Organizations: Organization Studies in the Postmodern 
World (London: Sage, 1990), at p. 13, who perceives behind this image “[…] the assumption that 
most of us, most of the time, are engaged in action with a practical interest in what one may be 
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